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Lecture I [Chapter The Function of Theory, pp. 45-53]
1 The direct use of language for definite purposes according to the needs of the moment
long preceded grammar, rhetoric and the dictionary. Breathing, eating, digesting, seeing
and hearing long preceded anatomy and physiology. We first act to meet special needs
and particular occasions. Only afterwards do we reflect upon what we do and how and
why we do it, and try to frame general principles, a philosophy of the matter. So with
social,  collective  action.  Men  built  up  customs  and  transmitted  traditions  to  their
offspring for centuries before they tried to discover any rationale in what they did. They
made no attempts at explanation. If asked what for one they would have said they had
such and [such] customs because they liked them, or because their ancestors told them so
to act or because their gods had established them. To question too closely was to be
impious or disloyal, and might result as with Socrates in death.
[End Page 1]
2 Thinking is naturally hard and obnoxious. It is easier to follow instinct and custom and
the orders of others. Men think when forced to do so by trouble by something the matter which
makes it necessary to find some way out not provided by habit and inclination. So men began to
philosophize about their collective habits, their established institutions only when these
began to cease [to]  function satisfactorily.  The difficulties might be internal  strife or
external  contacts  and  conflicts  or  both.  But  something  threatening  change  or
disintegration made men compare and inquire and attempt to select and hold on to the really
good.  Disease  and  wounds  of  battle  made  men  study  anatomy  and  the  normal
physiological  processes.  Otherwise  men  might  forever  have  taken  for  granted  their
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natural  processes  without  thinking of  them never directing attention to them.  Social
pathology had similar effect on social theorizing. Ill from Greece, from China. After theory had
once arisen life does not go on just the same. Men do not breathe and eat because of their
knowledge of anatomy and physiology. These acts still depend upon deeper forces. But
they may eat and breathe somewhat differently, especially in emergencies, because of their
knowledge. 
[End page 2]
3 The question may arise however as to what difference ideas, theories, philosophies really
make. Do they make a difference in what men do or only in what they feel about what
they do. Is philosophizing practical like steam as a driving force in the locomotive? Or is it
more like the noise of the escaping steam in the whistle – a by-product, an accompaniment, a
symptom of what is going on? There are replies which are highly exaggerated in both
directions. Bookish people and philosophers are likely to attach too much importance to
abstract  ideas,  to  regard  them  as  the  most  important  moving  causes.  They  seek
ideological explanations for everything. They overlook the extent to which men are still
driven into action by primary instincts like hunger, sex and love of power or comfort and
glory, by the pressure of circumstances and by the ease of paths of habit. They say for
example that the last war was primarily and essentially a conflict of philosophies,  of
systems of ideas. At the other extreme we have the so-called materialistic explanations of
institutions and social changes. Economic causes are said to be the only real or dynamic
causes. Ideas are effects, products 
[End page 3] 
4 only. Desires first for the primary necessities of life and then for power over others and
for enjoyment of the luxuries due to wealth are the only explaining causes. Even art and
religion and systems of morality as well as social customs and political regulations are to
be explained economically. The war was not a conflict of ideas and ideals but a struggle for
economic advantages and commercial supremacy. Ideals, theories are but a mask to conceal
the  material  struggle  going  on,  fine  phrases  to  arouse  the  multitude  that  allows
themselves to be beguiled by them. Philosophies that pretend to do more than analyze
and describe the play of economic forces are only dreams or else devices by which the few
powerful  maintain their  hold upon the masses.  We meet  here the first  great  question
concerning social philosophy – one which can only be answered in the course of the entire
discussion. But we shall at the outset dogmatically anticipate the nature of the reply that
will be developed in the subsequent lectures. Ideas, theories are originally products, causes of
non-intellectual forces. Thinking arises so to speak only in the thin cracks of solid habits, and
only with great difficulty penetrates the resistant 
[End page 4]
5 mass. Or it plays fitfully and like a phosphorescent gleam over the surface of vast ocean of
traditions,  customs and special  adaptations to circumstances.  But nonetheless it  does
have, had had, a really practical influence, and under certain conditions, to be dealt with in
the next  lecture,  may have  a  greater  directive influence  on affairs.  Effects after  they are
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brought into being get intermingled in all living forms with the causes that evolved them
and modify the forces that produced them. German philosophy [was] a product of German
conditions, not a deliverance of pure reason. But after it had become current [?] and
infiltrated into the minds of men, conceptions of system, order, efficiency, confirmed and
substantiated causes that might otherwise have passed away in time; it translated over into
minds of men what otherwise might have been passing events, it steadied, stabilized,
perpetuated transient physical  causes.  No need perhaps to argue in a country where
Confucianism has been a force for two thousands years that even admitting the concrete
and practical origin of the system that it organized solidified and focused and rendered
persistent  factors  that  without  the  intellectual  formulation  might  have  proved
temporary. Not ideas or theories by effective. But human beings who
[End page 5]
6 are permeated by certain ideas engrained in them by education are different persons, even
different machines, than if they entertained no such ideas or if they entertained different
ones. This is true even when ideas are false. A man with an illusion acts differently from
one without it. And while perhaps the main effect of philosophic systems has been to
consolidate spread and perpetuate the force of conditions that otherwise would have
been local and transient, yet they have also an exciting and driving force especially in
times of crises. The materialist admits too much when it says that theories, ideals are tools
used hypocritically by controlling vested interests to sway masses. For the assertion admits that
men are moved by ideals, and that they can be stirred to act in masses and energetically
against danger and odds only by appealing to ideals, to general conceptions. “Kultur in
danger,” on one hand, “liberty in danger” on the other. If great numbers of men had not
been made to believe this,  the war could not have been carried on. The most that is
proved is that general ideas are so efficacious, so powerful in times of crises, that the purely
material economic interests of the
[End page 6]
7 few can be executed only indirectly by acting upon the more idealistic desires and beliefs of the
many.  Especially is  this true under recent conditions of warfare where the old direct
motives of personal exploits and glory have lost efficacy – general motives, patriotism,
national feeling, justice, humanity, etc. have to be brought into play. No conception is falser
than that of men actuated by calculations of self interest. In many respects the world might be
better  if  there  were  more  prudence,  more  enlightened  selfishness,  more  deliberate
weighing of advantages and disadvantages. Action still rests upon instincts and emotions
rather than calculation but many instincts can be brought into play collectively only by means
of stimuli of an idealistic kind. And systems of thought, philosophies, that are abstract for
the few condense into such simple and moving mottoes, war-cries, ideals for the many.
[End page 7]
8 The reason for giving much time to the discussion of the practical efficacy of general
ideas and theories is that it  serves to bring out the alternative forces  that  move men –
customs,  established authority,  prejudice,  vested interests,  the ambitions of  powerful
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men leading them to utilize others as tools etc. The best evidence that philosophy has
some power is the fear of it expressed by the representatives and guardians of these interests.
Emerson stated the idea rather intensely when he said Beware when God lets loose a thinker
on the planet. All things then become fluid. Thinking means the introduction of a novel and in
so far incalculable factor – a deviation or departure, and an invention. The hidebound conservative
is justified in the uneasiness which he shows at attempts to formulate and justify rationally even
his own beliefs. The appeal to reason that is implied is unsettling.
[End page 8]
9 We must discriminate however between the different ways in which theories have practical
influence. In general we may distinguish three types. First those which are aware primarily
of  the  defects  in  existing  institutions  and  which  criticize  and  condemn  them.  They
conceive of a different ideal state, so different as to be opposed in a wholesale way and
capable of realization only in some revolutionary way. They are idealistic, if not romantic, 
utopian, in tone. They find the true standards and models of life in something apart from and
beyond existing affairs.  They hold that the mind has been corrupted by contact  with
things as they actually exist until it fails to perceive the true condition and model. But if
the  confusion,  darkness  and  error  due  to  this  influence  be  removed,  then  inner
illumination will enable men to see the truth and bring about a radical change. It is thus
sudden,  abrupt in its conceptions, and appeals to self-reliance, to inspiration from within,
combined with contempt for the existing state of things and its corrupting influence. Under
different conditions, something of this type is
[End page 9]
10 reflected in Plato’s Republic, the social aspirations of the early (as distinct from later)
Christians, Shelley’s poetry, the attitude of Lao-Tze. It expects things now despised to overthrow
those now esteemed, the weak things to confound the mighty; ideals to command the actual. It
colors thought in times of great social change; French Revolution, Russian, looks forward to a
new heaven and hearth.
11 The second type is sober, prudent, conservative. It aims at justifying the spirit of existing
institutions. It finds the true patterns and standards within affairs. It looks askance upon
change, especially abrupt change, because evil is due to departure from necessary meanings
and fixed relationships embedded in things.  Reform is restoration, recovery of these true
patterns. That is the attitude of such men as Aristotle, Confucius, Hegel. While the first type
is critical and pessimistic of things as they are, this one is complacent or optimistic. Essentially
if not incidentally things are right and reasonable. Evil is rather in the mind that has departed
from them. Instead then of appealing to the mind itself to find within itself intuitively
and innately ideals for change, it holds that the mind must be
[End page 10]
12 instructed and rectified by careful study of the things forms and relations that are external to it.
Its temper is realistic not idealistic. It aims at reform of character and mind to bring them into 
conformity with the true meanings of established institutions and relationships, not at reform of
institutions  by  appeal  to  the  inner  ideals  of  the  illuminated  mind.  It  teaches  self-distrust,
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distrust of enthusiasm, impulse, the importance of patient study and instruction from without.
It tends to subordinate the individual self, as the radical type tends to exalt it.
13 Now both of these types of theory in spite of their profound antagonism to each other
agree  in  being  wholesale –  in  taking  a  general  attitude  [of]  either  condemnation  or
justification toward things as they are. Both of them then lack the kind of practical power or
efficacy most  needed –  power  to  project  and direct  the  changes  that  are  required.  The first
expects some sudden and revolutionary change to bring in an ideal condition; the second
resists all change. But what humanity needs is ability to shape and direct the changes that are
bound to occur. The conservative [type] lacks leverage for guiding change because it consecrates
and justifies things as they es-
[End page 11]
sentially are. The radical and idealistic type lacks leverage with things as they are because
it opposes the inner ideal to the outer affair and institution in a wholesale way. The net
result is either negative and destructive action or else inaction, passivity, waiting for the ideal to be
realized by some miracle of change.
14 The following lectures will attempt then to state and apply the third type of social and
political thought, criticizing those historic philosophies which upon the whole lean to one
or other of the first two types mentioned. The next lecture in particular will be devoted to
an exposition of the chief traits of the third sort of theory.
[End page 12]
 
Lecture II [Chapter Science and Social Philosophy,
pp. 54-63]
15 The entire history of the 19th century in the West is marked by attempts to create [?]
sciences  as  distinct  from  philosophy  of  society.  Political  economy,  political  science,
science of government, of anthropology, languages, religions etc, sociology, [science] of
history, even of morals. These efforts express a reaction against the control of human
affairs by mere habit, by vested interests, by authority, by accident and belief in miracle.
[They] Mark a belief in reign of law, in uniformity of nature, in human and collective
affairs as well  as in inanimate nature.  They were the fruit of  the advance of natural
science, and the mark of confidence in [the] ability of the human mind to subjugate also
the  seeming  wilderness  and  irregularity  of  human  activities.  When  the  positivistic
matter-of-fact  spirit  invaded the consideration of  society  and politics,  philosophy was
condemned as speculative and pretentious, unverifiable. We cannot go into the fortunes
of these attempts at social science. But roughly speaking, it may be said that so far they
have fallen short of realizing their claims, and have in a certain sense been more artificial
than  the  philosophies  they  invoked  [?]  to  replace.  They  selected  certain  facts,
characteristic of a particular
[End page 1]
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16 epoch and state of affairs, and making generalizations that described the main features of
those particular epochs, laid them down as universal laws, as sweeping and as necessary
as the laws of physics or astronomy. The so-called science of political economy for example
arrived at generalizations concerning the activities of men in the capitalistic competitive
regime characterized by production in bulk for a distant market with exchange governed
by financial credit, by money, for money profit. It was a theory of business. Then in order
that  the  generalizations  might  have  the  rank of  a  science,  they  assumed that  these
generalizations apply universally  to the industrial  and economic activities  of  men.  A
knowledge of China or of past history is enough to prove that we are not dealing with a
science but with certain tendencies predominating at a certain limited portion of time
under peculiar historic conditions. The same may be said of political science. It is in fact a
description of  certain forms of  institutions which have been developing in the West
during the last few centuries and which especially characterized the Europe of the 19th
century,  the  nationalistic  territorial  state with  a  constitutional  and  representative
government based on a certain kind of suffrage. 
[End of page 2]
17 Claim to universality is  absurd when the whole range of  human affairs is  taken into
account. Only a deification of local and possibly temporary circumstances. The “sciences”
may be called more artificial than the philosophies because the latter were more or less
frankly imaginative and speculative, telling what should be, while the sciences claimed to
give an account of things as they must be.
18 II. This does not mean the sciences are useless or negligible. Aside from representing the
feeling that (1) human affairs like physical [ones] can be investigated and understood,
aside from (2) bringing to light a great amount of valuable facts, they introduce [a] factor
which must profoundly modify the social philosophies of the future. (3) The scientific spirit
, the scientific method in its larger sense as a way of dealing with facts and plans is their
contribution, and it is this contribution which makes possible and necessary a third type of
political theorizing, in distinction from the two kinds considered at the last hour, a type
which may possess the directive power they lacked. There is (1) the importance attached to
actual facts and the need of basing theory upon them. There is (2) the need of abolition of
injecting into accounts partisan glorification and
[End page 3]
19 condemnation,  distinguishing between phenomena and one’s  wishes about what they
should be. (3) The reduction if not elimination of the dogmatic and authoritarian habit of
mind; (4) the willingness to take things in detail rather [than] in sweeping generalities,
retail rather than wholesale; (5) the willingness to treat alleged principles and laws as
only provisional hypotheses; (6) the creation of a demand for experimental verification – all
of these things are due to the influence of the spirit of science and they persist when the
sweeping claims to scientific laws of universal scope is dropped. THUS THERE ARISES THE
POSSIBILITY OF A THIRD TYPE OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DISTINGUISHED IN IMPORTANT
REGARDS FROM THE TWO CONSIDERED AT THE LAST TIME (Will condense the above in
lecture).1
Lectures in Social and Political Philosophy
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VII-2 | 2015
6
20 III. The union of the scientific spirit with the moral and practical aim of philosophy. The great
thing about the classic systems of philosophy is that they thought with a purpose in view.
They  were  not  satisfied  with  mere  description  or  observation.  They  tried  to  educe
principle for the directions of life, principles to be used in judging the value of events and
in projecting plans and purposes. Nothing less than this can content man in social affairs.
For we are not mere outside observers; we are sharers, partners. Our own destiny and
fortune is [at] stake in the course of events. We want them to turn out one way rather
than
[End page 4]
21 in another way, and we use our observations of what is in our order to make decisions
about [what] may and shall be. In the so-called pure sciences we take the position of
merely looking at things to note what is going on. We are outside of them. Our own hopes,
fears, desires and observations have nothing to do with the future changes of the moon.
The scene so far as we are concerned is a closed and finished one. Our own activities do not
enter into its making or remaking. It  is only in the “applied” science, like agriculture,
medicine, engineering (civil, mechanical, electrical) that we use our knowledge to enter as
active partners into what is going on to make it different from what it would be if we do not act and
act upon our own knowledge.
22 In other words the social sciences are not pure; they are like applied sciences. They are
concerned with the intelligent reshaping or alteration of existing conditions. It has been said that
we know backwards; what has been done – a fact is something done – dead, done with. We
act forward; an act is something still doing to change things. Bergson has pointed out that
we cannot have the same kind of science of life that we have of the inanimate. We are deal-
[End page 5]
ing not with [the] finished and self-repeating, but with the unfinished, where the new,
the truly novel enters in, and where we are ourselves interested, concerned in what is to
happen and deliberately try to make it different in quality, to invent and reconstruct and
alter, and where our knowledge of what is and has been is inevitably subordinated to our
efforts to give future happenings one shape rather than other – where our knowledge in
short is practical like that of the physician who attempts by acting upon what he knows to
produce health in place of disease. It is absurd to suppose that we can have a cold-blooded
social science that eliminates desire and preference and emotion and bias. But we can
clarify and enlighten our desires. Our art of medicine depends upon a bias in favor of life.
We want to live, we insist upon it. We use the cold theoretical knowledge of chemistry, of
anatomy and physiology to direct our want, our desire more effectively, to make our bias
more adjusted to conditions, less blind and at the mercy of accident. Hence the primary
features of our third type.
23 IV. It is pragmatic, instrumental. That is, it aims to be an art, an applied science, a form of
social engineering. Politics is an art, but should not be a blind or routine or magical art,
not directed by intrigue or vested interest etc. 
[End page 6]
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24 It rests on the possibility of introducing more conscious regulation into the course of events in
behalf of the general or public interests. It believes that the art of politics is now too much an
art of special manipulation in behalf of particular and concealed interests or ends. It may
become an art like the art of engineering in quality, if not in extent and quality. The
building of railways and bridges, of canals and electric dynamos recognizes the supremacy
of human aims and desires.  It  uses factual knowledge in behalf  of  collective human ends and
purposes.  But the use depends upon positive sciences and hence is not blind, random,
accidental, or merely traditional. It can conceive and execute new things in an orderly
way that turns the course of natural phenomena in definite channels. In like fashion our
social and political notions and theories and systems must be used for social constructions,
for social engineering and must be subjected to the tests of such use.
25 V. Hence social philosophy must be specific,  not universal. Nobody builds a railway in
general.  We  build  a  particular  railway  with  reference  to  specific  localities,  their
geographical features, rivers, mountains, valleys, the position of 
[End page 7]
towns,  the  distribution  of  the  population,  the  raw  materials,  economic  resources
occupations and products. In other words, the project is based upon a study of a special
concrete situation, the needs that have to be met, the resources at hand and potential,
the obstacles to be overcome, the definite aims in view, consequences to accrue, political,
industrial, financial etc. The problem is one of ends and means in a particular situation.
In contrast with this classic social philosophies have been wholesale and absolute. They
have laid claim to universal validity,  good for all time and places and circumstances.
General radicalism or general conservatism, instead of changing and conserving special
factors according to the needs of the particular situation in which men actually found
themselves. Everybody knows the part played in historic philosophies by individualistic
and universalistic theories respectively by those which have emphasized the initiative
and freedom of the individual and those which have emphasized the state, law and order
in general and the subordination of the individual to them. What has not been a part of
these philosophies is of necessity – since there is a place for both elements in life, his-
[End page 8]
toric conditions may lead to the need of emphasis upon the factor at one time and another factor in
another –  that  neither  philosophy  is  true  universally  and  abstractly  speaking  but  both  are
applicable  under  specific  conditions.  Because men do not build tunnels on a plain is  no
reason  for  formulating  a  theory  that  tunnels  are  always  objectionable  and  thereby
retarding building  of  railways  in  mountainous  districts.  In  Europe in  the  seventeenth
century there was a general break-up of institutions, a scene of wars religious and civil. It
was natural that in this threatening chaos and dissolution of civilization men should have
prized order, and looked to authority that had the power of enforcing it. The conditions
favored unification and centralization. But the non-scientific absolutistic habit of mind
took the need out of its context and made a universal and necessary principle out of it. It has
favored the formation of a new evil,  absolute and tyrannic government in process of
correcting  the  existing  ill,  and  contributed  to  latter  times  the  tradition  of  an
authoritative  state  –  such  as  influenced  Germany  in  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth
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century. On the other hand, the later part of the eighteenth century was a time in which
the industrial changes due to [the] use of steam in manufacturing had made obso-
[End page 9]
lete and harmful many laws, institutions and practices that had grown up in prior conditions
in which they had worked more or less well. But under the new conditions they worked
inequitably and in a hampering way. They needed to be swept away to give freer play to
the new enterprises made possible by the use of steam in production and distribution. To
be successful and to be able to make their contribution to the public benefit, individuals
needed to be emancipated so their own initiative should have more scope. But unfortunately this
relative and specific need was frozen into a universal principle. All social regulation of
industry and business were proclaimed to be evil. No collective direction of economics by
the  organized  deliberation  and  decision  of  society  was  possible  and  desirable.  The
functions of the state must always be limited to protecting individuals in the exercise of
their freedom as long so did not encroach on a similar freedom of others. Laissez-faire
and the police theory of law and government. In short a movement valid within certain
limits, those of the historic situation in which it arose and with reference to which it was
remedial, was erected into an absolute and universal truth. Later on the 
[End page 10]
evils of this conception became apparent, and there was a corresponding reaction in the
direction of state socialism, of general state ownership and regulation of all  business
undertakings, free individual activity and competition were declared not simply to have
led to evils under the particular conditions in which they were conducted, but to [be] bad
inherently. This oscillation from one extreme of theory to another is illustrative of what
happens wherever the wholesale and absolute type of theory prevails. What is needed is
to see that every philosophy since it has a practical aim is relative to the specific situation
which requires rectification. We must think within limits set by special ills and special
resources at hand for correcting them. Avoid large, general isms, and consider specific
questions, using the isms simply for what light they may throw on the special need at
hand. It is especially the tragedy of warm enthusiastic social idealisms that in the long run they
play  into  the  hands  of  reactionaries  by  thinking  and  talking  in  impossibly  wholesale  terms,
forgetting that development is a matter of a very large number of specific changes that have to be
accomplished in detail one by one, and that to try to do everything in a general way is likely to
result in failure to do anything
[End page 11]
in particular except by chance.
26 VI. Hence the third type of philosophy substitutes discrimination of particular consequences of
good and bad, better and worse, for general criticism and justification. It tries to find out how
this and that arrangement, custom and institution works in detail to promote happiness
or misery. It aims at amelioration, at improvement of this and that bad feature rather than
at  either  universal  condemnation and destruction or  consecration and conservatism.
Progress is its watchword, while it also recognized that progress must be in definite points
where reorganization is needed, and not all  over at once.  It recognizes that there must be
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found  positively  good  things,  to  use  as  tools  and  resources,  as  active  agencies  in
correcting the things that require improvement. It avoids the illusion (1) that things are
essentially unchangeable because human nature is always the same, and (2) the idea that
any single sweeping change of law or intuitions can be successfully accomplished all at
once. Especially it looks to education, to enlightenment and equipment of specific human beings
, to introduce improvements and to make them genuine and enduring, rather than to any magic
wand of enactment or legislation or outer administration.
[End page 12]
27 Reverting to question of the practical efficacy of theory, it be said that traditional types
are of actual social effect accidentally rather than purposefully. They reinforce customs that
exist independently of them by rationalizing and justifying them. Or they express strong
emotional likes and dislikes and inspire men to attack. But they are not purposefully useful.
They are useful the way a tree happens to be for plowing tho it was not intended for that
use. But ideas that are framed from study of special conditions will be valuable and valid just in
the  degree  in  which  they  help  solve  problems.  Moreover  [they]  are  subjected  to  test  by
verification.  [They are] Taken out of the region of assertion and brute force and mere
argument. Social philosophy should be a bridge from the existent unsatisfactory situation to a
better future state of things based upon accurate knowledge of evils to be corrected and definite
projects of change at this point and that.
[End page 13]
 
Lecture III [Chapter Social Conflict, pp. 64-71]
28 Theory  began in  disturbance,  confusion,  friction.  It  attempts  to  discover  causes  and
project plans of reorganization that bring about unity,  harmony, freer movement. To
locate  special  difficulties  and  define  particular  problems  we  need  some  idea  of  the
sources and causes of social irregularities in general. Some conflict of forces. The older
type of theory set up a general conflict of order and progress, or authority and freedom,
law and rights, society and the individual, the personal and the institutional. But we are
after something less an opposition of abstract notions and more of concrete social forces.
It is not ideas that have to be reconciled primarily but facts, human beings. And we want
something more varied, more diversified than the few general heads like individual and
social into which every trouble has to be forced.
29 The significant conflicts are conflicts of groups, classes, factions, parties, peoples. A group
is a number of people associated together for some purposes, some common activity that
holds them.
[End page 1]
30 Human nature has a variety of interests to be served, a number of types of impulses that
have to be expressed, or instincts that form needs to be satisfied, and about each one of
the more fundamental of these some form of association, of living together or of acting
together continuously or repeatedly and regularly (as distinct from mere chance and
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transient contacts). Above [?] the sexual need and the function of reproduction there
grows up the cohabitation of man and woman, and then the adhesion of children – the
family group or form of associated life. The need of support, of sustenance and the need
of regular activity, of impressing the energy of man upon nature, develop association for
industry and business. Again men associate for worship, for religious ends and churches,
monastic orders come into existence. Men’s interest in investigation and discovery make
them join together  for  educational  ends,  schools,  learned societies,  etc.  The need of
regulating men’s conducts, their behavior to one another, protecting public order etc.,
and the desire for power and authority give rise to gov-
[End page 2]
ernmental association, political society. Aside from the hundreds of special associations
for  amusement,  companionship,  common feasts,  which are  more [or]  less  temporary
clubs, we have these fairly universal modes of union and association.
31 We  can  frame  in  imagination  a  picture  in  which  there  is  an  equal  proportionate
development of all these forms of associated life, where they interact freely with one
another, and where the results of each one contribute to the richness and significance of
every other, where family relations assist equally the cooperation of men in science, art,
religion and public life, where association for production and sale of goods enriches not
merely  materially  but  morally  and  intellectually  all  forms  and  modes  of  human
intercourse – where in short there is mutual stimulation and support and free passage of
significant results from one to another. Such an ideal picture is of use only because it
helps us paint by contrast the state of things which has actually brought about social
divisions and conflict. European history for example was marked for 
[End page 3]
centuries by such a predominance of association for religious purposes, by the church,
that other modes of life were more or less suppressed, choked, dwarfed, or deflected into
one-sided channels. Family life [was] affected because chastity was supposed to involve
abstinence from marriage, the celibate life [was supposed to be] superior; industry [was
affected] because wealth and material production was a distraction from the spiritual life;
science  [was  affected]  because  the  results  of  free  inquiry  might  be  dangerous  to
theological doctrines of the church; art [was affected because it] might instill a love for
the things of the eye and the flesh at the expense of divine things. So these were allowed
and cultivated only as they took a form subordinate to the dominant religious interest;
they had to be made to contribute in a one sided way to the supremacy of the church –
architecture, music, painting, philosophy etc. Then again for some centuries history was
marked by a struggle between the church and the state, between human combination in
the interest of religion, and in the interest of organized secular public life – religious wars
etc. [The] Struggle [has] not ended 
[End page 4]
yet. Contemporary politics [in] France, Italy, and even the educational problems of Great
Britain  cannot  be  understood  without  reference  to  it.  During  the  seventeenth  and
eighteenth centuries the history of the progress of natural science is largely a history of
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conflict of the interest in observation and inquiry with the better established authority of
the church.
32 These conflicts of institutions are so common that we take them for granted as almost the
very stuff of history itself. They are here referred to because they prove so conclusively
that  men’s  various interests  do not  march four abreast,  evenly and uniformly.  Some
interest with the form of association in which it is embodied gets a particularly intense
and widespread start; it then lords it over other interests and associations and makes
them  tributary  so  far  as  may  be  to  itself.  It  insists  upon  dominating  activity,
monopolizing attention and interest. Free give and take, mutual enrichment, reciprocal
stimulation is prevented. Then the interest in 
[End page 5]
question  becomes  isolated;  it  ceases  to  be  fed  by  natural  sources;  it  becomes  rigid,
petrified,  fossilized,  and unless  its  pretensions are broken down and interaction and
balance restored, it decays, there is general relapse and stagnation, corruption. Some
force has to come in from outside to stir things up and bring about a vital interplay of
social activities. A mode of social life that is monopolistic of human energy and attention,
comparatively speaking, necessarily becomes itself one sided; it lacks the contacts which
will give it fullness and an all-around character. It becomes at once harsh and relatively
empty, barren.
33 We may take another example from present conditions. The last two or three centuries
has seen a great growth in the importance of the political organization known as the
state.  After  becoming emancipated in Europe from the control  of  the church,  it  has
tended to become an all-engrossing thing, as is evident in the doctrine of the Sovereignty
of  the  State.  Two  stages  are  obvious.  At  first,  the  state  was  identified  with  the
government, and the control of the governing group was so great
[End page 6]
that it was looked upon as despotic and tyrannical, and constitutions and representative
government and general suffrage were brought into existence largely to check arbitrary
exactions on life and property. Civil freedom required checks on governmental action.
1688 in England, 1789 in France. In the nineteenth century, state became identified with
the nation as an organized whole dealing as an entity with other nations. The late war is a
proof of the ascendency of the state interest; the sacrifices and subordinations of life,
property, freedom of industry, thought, science, publication it is capable of exacting. The
government as the universal carrier. Now there is a reaction against the very idea of the
state.  Such  as  the  doctrine  of  anarchy  or  purely  voluntary  group  associations.  This
doctrine flourishes only where and when the state has become exaggerate and rigid, and
other forms of association thrown out of balance. 
34 In general it must be noted that certain areas and times have tended to concentrate upon
certain forms. Greece upon civic life, the organized community, city-state; Medieval, the
church as noted;
[End page 7]
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the East, the family principle; the contemporary West, especially America industrial and
economic groups cutting across the other forms of life, and tending to subordinate them
to its own unchecked aggrandizement. In dealing then on the basis of theory with any
particular social condition we need first to ask what pattern of human association tends
to be central and regulative; what are the one-sidednesses and arrests,  fixation [and]
rigidities thereby produced; where are the suppressions from which society is suffering in
consequence; what are the points of conflict, strife, antagonism of interest. 
35 The point of view may perhaps [be] illustrated by a sketchy and superficial account of the
tendencies and problems created by when the family or blood-kin basis gets exaggerated.
36 There are good reasons why the family principle should be expressed first historically.
The perpetuation of society depends upon the union of man and woman and the care,
physical and intellectual, of the offspring. The family is not merely the family. It is also
the household, 
[End page 8]
which  is  the  economic  and  industrial  form  of  association.  Aristotle’s  conception  of
economics,  domestic,  property,  reproduction  of  life,  property,  slaves  serfs,  political
economy that of state, public finance and property etc. Arts perpetuated [?] in family –
apprenticeship, adoption into the family guild. But the authority of parents, especially of
male, exercised in the family and [in the] household group made family absorb functions
of political association. Patriarchal rule. Even after families were consolidated into a civic
community, the authority of the ruler was often that of the head patriarch, the dominant
family  among  a  group  of  families.  Primitive  family  [was]  also  the  religious  and
educational unit. The father the priest; the household alter, divinities; ancestral worship,
filial  piety.  The  dominant  pattern,  others  subordinated  even  when  they  split  off.
Contribution of family idea to ethics. Intimacy, love, care protection, ties of blood and
kin,  God the father,  all  men brothers.  But  [there were]  certain evils.  Summed up in
subordination of women to men, women [being] passive means of reproduction, and of
inferiors to superiors fixed naturally, physically and unalterably. Aristotle – on position
of women; and some persons naturally slaves, tools.
[End page 9]
37 Certain classes in community not really parts, sharers in community life but external
means, must live, supply conditions to higher, leisure class that devotes itself to higher
things. All the more significant because Aristotle was not moved primarily by family idea
but civic; family only survived and projected itself. In politics generally, the state began
as the Es-tate, the dominion of the ruler. The dominion, that over which one exercised
rule, lordship, authority, was the same as property. Women a property. The maxim of
English law; husband and wife are one and for legal purposes the husband is that one. The
religious factor came in – early political societies theocratic – divine right of kings. The
king – the direct representative of God – perpetuated long after the priestly function was
obscured. The mystic value, mysterious and emotional, awe, reverence. One of the chief
obstacles to straight [?], sensible treatment of government. 
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38 Now [it is] obvious that all these things involve a one-sidedness and distortion of human
nature  –  suppression of  growth in  some direction,  exaggeration in  others.  Lordship,
mastery, authority stimulated out of all properties
[End page 10]
in a few. The qualities that could be developed only by direct share in associations for
advance  of  intellectual  life,  art,  industry,  religion,  inhibited. Even as  these  forms  of
association grow up, they are not free to grow; they have to accommodate themselves to
habits carried over from a prior dominate association.
39 That the unequal and unbalanced development of forms of life is the source of social
difficulties in general and that the problem of theory is to detect these causes in detail
and provide plans for remedial action thus appears. We have to add however one more
source of conflict from this source. We have not mentioned the local, or territorial source
of combination in life. The neighborhood, acquaintance, familiarity, as bond of union. Our
village, district, province, nation, as distinct from outsiders, instinctive attitude toward
the strange, alien foreign in appearance and custom, habits, clothes, one of suspicion, fear
dislike. Our church, club, clique, circle, party, college, class, those who have the same
habits, who are familiar with one another and under-
[End page 11]
stand one another. Exclusiveness, prejudice, jealously, isolation, hostility – from national
wars to local jealousies. Who is my neighbor? Who was neighbor to the man who fell
among thieves? The idea the need and capacity to help, to be of use are bonds of union
irrespective of local contiguity and the familiarity that makes [them] possible is one slow
to appear and hard to realize. This principle of association cuts across all the others, runs
through them all. It adds new sources of social discord and ill, and intensifies all the old
ones.
40 {At the present time, the need for social philosophy [is] urgent because the increased
mobility  of  life  has  affected  both  the  great  principles  of  association.  Old  forms  of
association are thrown out of gear, family, church political [party], school, because of the
rapid development of industrial changes. These also have brought local groups into closer
contact with each other increased sources of friction in increasing those for combined
action and cooperation. Made common understanding more important and organization
to perpetuate it. Critical state of world}.
[End page 12]
 
Lecture IV [Chapter Social Reform, pp. 72-81]
41 The point of view presented at the last hour was that the practical difficulties which lie
back of theoretical social problems are due to the exaggerated development of some one
interest in a given type of society, the family, the religious, the economic, the political,
that  of  personal  acquaintance  or  whatever.  This  exaggerated  development  of  some
interest brings groups or classes of persons into conflict with one another; it leads to
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friction, contention, strife and division, and to confusion, disorder and uncertainty. For at
some  point  the  suppressed  side  of  human  interest,  the  instincts  that  have  not  got
expression and satisfaction come to consciousness, and they claim the right to operate.
And they are not abstract but are embodied in definite groups of persons. There is no
struggle  between  science  and  religion,  between  church  and  state,  but  there  is  one
between those concrete human beings who exercise, say, the controlling power through
the church and other men and women whose instincts to investigate and discover or to
promote secular welfare, or achieve political power, are repressed and thwarted.
42 This however is not the usual way of stating the origin, the source and nature of the social
problems that form social theory. It is usually said that the conflict of society and the
individual is such as to lead to the need of harmonizing or adjusting the respective claims
of one to the other,  and that social  philosophy is the theory as to which [is]  to [be]
supreme or how the claims of one are to be reconciled with the those of the other –
individual liberty with social control, freedom and authority rights and law etc. Today we
take up two questions.  (1) How does it  happen that social  philosophy has become so
preoccupied with a wrong conception? And (2) what practical difference is there between
the two ways of stating and attacking social questions? Is the difference anything more
than an academic one, a speculative difference?
43 One set of persons represents and embodies 
[End page 1]
the  dominant,  law-interpreting  group  and  other  persons  the  subdued,  depressed,
comparatively dumb group. The former have the authority, the prestige of custom, to
back them. Just because they represent what is established, the customary and instituted
order, they appear to embody the claims, authority and majesty of society. The persons
who represent  the  relatively  suppressed  group will  appear  to  behave  socially,  to  be
actuated by social motives just as long as they accept the existing state of things and
conform to its traditions and prescriptions. When they revolt, and desire to change things
in order that some other social interest may have fuller expression, they do not appear to
be acting in behalf of any social purpose or good at all. They are placed in the position of
making claims on their own individualistic account because they do not have the sanction
of any social aim which has become acknowledged authoritatively. Thus it comes about
that egoism, selfishness, which has become established by custom, which has attained
recognition and prestige, puts on the garb of social sanc-
[End page 1 bis]
tion and moral standards, of law and order, while activities which in reality express a
wider and more just social arrangement are held to be lawless, manifesting the selfish
desires  of  a  number  of  individuals to  disturb  society in  behalf  of  their  own  egoistic
indulgences and ambitions. This struggle for the rectification of social inequalities which
affect large groups and interests and functions in their relation to one another is the
primary reason for the belief that the primary problem is the conflict of society with
individualism and that the chief problem of social theory is to determine which has the
superior claim and authority.
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44 For example, in the conflict of secular interests, science, industry commerce, with the
religious embodied in the ecclesiastic institution, the latter occupied the place of social
advantage. The social benefits and organizations represented by freedom of thought and
belief, of worship and conscience, were in the future. They were, so to speak, matters of 
[End page 2]
faith.
45 The church was a social organization that exercised positive social functions of instruction
and control; its social quality was a matter of sight. Just because the scientific interest had
not been allowed to function freely its power as a source of organization and direction, its
place as a basis of human association and companionship, could not be demonstrated.
Hence the representatives most naturally asserted that they represented the claims of
individuality, irrespective of  or even in opposition to social  organizations, the claims of
individuality [against] a force which shackled and tyrannized. On the other hands, the
representatives of the church naturally conceived of themselves as upholders of law and
order as conservators of all the social values that alone made life worth living and that
restrained human nature  from indulging in  unbridled excess.  They claimed that  the
innovators, those who wanted freedom of belief, worship and teaching, were actuated by
anti-social purposes, that their claims to spiritual and moral freedom were merely cloaks
for 
[End page 3]
sinister self-interest which wanted to subvert society so that there would be no check on
vicious  egotism  and  self-seeking.  In  short  one  form  of  self-seeking,  of  selfish
aggrandizement had been [illeg.] so institutionalized, so wrapped up with all forms of life,
and so controlling, that it did not seem to express selfish ambition and aggrandizement,
sheer  love of  power at  all.  It  was an expression essentially  (even though marred by
inevitable human defects) of the principle of social authority and illumination.
46 Perhaps a still better example is found in the state of things that happens when society is
primarily  organized  on  the  family  pattern,  when  the  family  association,  clan  or
household, is the ruling one. In such a situation, the egotism of adults and of men, of the
male adults, is stimulated, but at the same time it gets a strong social sanction – it acquires
the appearance of being actuated by high moral motives of preservation of social peace
and order,  the  conservation and perpetuation of  the  traditions  and ideals  by  which
society lives and is made possible. Just in the degree in which the special and one-side
interests of the male adult become institutional-
[End page 4]
ized,  and  standardized,  vested  interests,  and  they  become  influential,  that  is  to  say
actually bound up with all  forms of social  intercourse and relationships,  affecting all
ceremonies and the trend of thought and action, those interests take on social justification,
glory, prestige. An innate egotism is clothed and armed with socially important purposes
and supports. Any movement then for greater freedom on the part of the young, freedom
to select vocation, to choose their own mates, to make their own political affiliations, to
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determine their own moral and religious beliefs is presented not merely as a conflict of
personal wills, of one set of individuals over against another, but as an attack of licentious
individualism  upon  the  foundations  of  society;  as  leading  to  lawless  individualism,
overthrowing all coherent social authority, because undermining organization. On the
other hand, the young, while they may feel a strong faith that the accomplishing of their
desire for greater freedom would improve society and put human relationships on a
secured basis, can not prove it by pointing to an established order where this state is
realized.
[End page 5]
47 It can only claim that certain natural, inherent and inalienable claims of individuality are
being suppressed by the exactions of convention and social institutions. The social side of
their  aspiration  may  present  itself  only  as  a  vague  utopian  idealism,  a  passionate
assertion  of  a  new  and  redeemed  society.  Actually  they  claim  the  right  to  assert
individualism no matter what happens socially; they become rebels against society while in
truth [they are] only asking for social reorganization, which will make the relation of the
family group to scientific, literary, religious, industrial and political groups more flexible,
less frozen and rigid.
48 One of the most marked movements of the later nineteenth century and present day is
feminism – the movement for the rights of women, the emancipation of woman. Rights to
an education, to a place in industry or economic independence, to engage in professions
previously engrossed by men, to take part in making laws and administering them. Now it
is clear that that has not been generally thought of as a struggle between social groups, or
between sets of individuals. It has present-
[End page 6]
ed itself as [a] claim for greater liberty on the part of some individuals, as at its best a
protest  against  social abuses,  tyrannies,  oppressions.  While those who did not like it,
whose comfort privileges, enjoyments and power were disturbed or threatened, regarded
it as an antisocial willful attack upon the very foundation of social relationships on the part of a
few aggressive, more or less ill-natured and disappointed women. As a matter of fact it is
an incident of general social changes, of new action of social forces bringing about a re-
construction of social groups and of their adjustment to one another – not to be specific a
destruction of the family,  but  among other things an insuring that  the humane and
sympathetic interests and aims of the family which have been the especial charge of
women shall not be confined within the walls of the home, but shall have a chance to [be]
carried  into  schools,  shops,  factories,  professions,  politics  etc.,  and  that  the  more
impersonal, abstract and possessive interest of the male shall
[End page 7] 
no longer so dominate action as to set up barriers against the free give and take of social
groups and the interests which they represent.
49 It is interesting to note that it is in the earlier stages of a movement when its object is least
evident, when it  takes  the most  the form of  a  protest,  that  its  so-called individualistic
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character is most evident. We may indeed distinguish three stages. In the first there is such
an equilibrium that the suppressed group or class is not aware of its suppression, or takes
it as part of the established and necessary order of things. There are not opportunities
that suggest an idea of a different state of things, and hence no idea of an effort to bring
about change. When slavery is most complete, when government is most successfully
despotic there is no thought of slavery or despotism as evils to be protested against. Only
when conditions are such as to stimulate a consciousness of powers which are not expressed
and satisfied is there definite revolt and effort at change. When industrial changes took
away 
[End page 8] 
from women household activities that had belonged to them previously, there was not
only relative loss of activity, but also a leisure for other things. Better education was
given. This created a sense of powers that had no outlet and created restlessness and
uneasiness which didn’t exist as long as women had [been] more completely absorbed in
the household life.
50 The second stage is  than that of  restlessness, discontent, because social  conditions have
changed enough to arouse a sense of powers which do not function, which have no definite social
channel provided for their utilization. This is the period of marked “individualism” of revolt
against  authority and established institutions,  a  feeling that  they are [either]  merely
conventional,  or  else  positively  oppressive  and  to  be  destroyed  in  the  interests  of
individual  freedom,  which  is  negatively  viewed [as]  absence  of  restraint doing  as  one
pleases etc. (3) But as social organization proceeds and the capacities of the submerged
group are not merely stimulated and brought to consciousness in an emotional way, but 
get some definite channel of exercise, the demand ceases to be for individualistic expres-
[End page 9]
sion, and becomes a demand for a chance to perform a badly needed social function. The claim
shifts from a right to a neglected social duty.
51 There are similar stages in the growth of the scientific interest. (1) At first it is merely
submerged;  there  is  conformity,  acquiescence  in  whatever  ideas  are  current.  The
authority of custom is so general that it is not felt to be an external authority; it is just
part of the regular and unquestioned order. Whatever independence or originality exists
finds vent in framing fantastic tales, or myths and legends which do not conflict with the
recognized system of beliefs. Then as some event, generally contact with people having
different ideas and beliefs or with unusual natural phenomena through travel, arouses
doubt and questioning.  (2)  Doubts  and questions  are  however  usually  resented by the
existing social, ecclesiastic and political regime as involving an attack upon its authority,
as anti-social, subversive. Persecutions, strong or mild [take] 
[End page 10]
place. Hence the new inquiries, which represent the rise out of its submergence, are likely
to identify the existing social  order with society itself  and to claim the right of  free
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inquiry  and belief  not  as  right  to  exercise  a  power socially  needed,  but  as  a  purely
personal, private right, inherent in them as individuals, irrespective of all social bearings
[End page 11]
52 The natural right to inquire and chose belief is said to be supreme even if it involves
social  subversion.  (3)  In  the  third  stage,  the  scientific  movement  has  got  enough
organization, it has grouped about itself a sufficient number of persons, so that it has a
social standing and repute; it has enough headway so that its social bearings are apparent,
and the claim of the right to exercise the scientific interest is made in behalf of social
need and welfare not in behalf of purely individualistic non-social factors.
53 The same three stages may be detected in the history of the labor movement. First slavery
and serfdom acquiesced in on both side as matter of course. Second, a social change that
arouses a consciousness of wants and desires and a realization of suppression of activities
– a movement of revolt, of emancipation, of claims for personal rights and enjoyments.
Natural, inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness residing in the
individual irrespective of social consideration. Thirdly it is seen that these are only mask
for a social need and concern: the demand that laborers 
[End page 11a]
have the education, the resources, the cultivation and power so that society can have its
work done most effectively and happily.
54 II. What practical difference does it make whether we adopt this point of view or the
traditional one of conflict and adjustment of social and individual? The answer is that the
latter leads to the formation of opposed groups based on emotion, prejudice and vested rights and
wrongs, and stimulates resort to the method of dispute, recrimination and even physical force.
Men takes sides for the social in general, for authority and control in general or for liberty and
individualism in general. There is assertion and counter-assertion, bitter quarreling, but no
way of arriving at a common conclusion by the use of intelligence in analyzing specific conditions,
studying  definite  problems  of  cause  and  effects.  Blind adherence to  conservatism and to
change,  under  conditions  which  makes  the  first despotic  reactionary  and  the  second
destructive. If the point of view here urged were generally ado-
[End page 11b]
pted, it would be recognized that institutions, conventions, modes of social control that direct
the thoughts and acts of the members of society are bound to grow up; they are inevitable; it
is impossible to get rid of them – to destroy one form is only to set up another – as [it]
may be seen in the rule of the Bolskeviki after destroying that of the Czars. It is not only
inevitable, but also in some form indispensable,  useful. The real point is to discriminate
among them, for customs, conventions, institutions are better and worse, and the point is
to keep the good and improve or do away with the worse. This means an appeal to intelligence, not
to bias and prejudice and vested interests, to inquiry to trace causes and consequences, to see what
produced  this  or  that  institution  or  arrangement,  the  historic  method,  and  also  to  trace
consequences, to see how the arrangement works, what effects it produces – and the same for any
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proposed measure of reform, improvement. The practical difference is thus the substitution of
the scientific method for the method of opinion,
[End page 12]
dogmatic assertion, bitter recriminations and disparaging name calling, epithets of abuse. Method
of analysis, of taking things in details and discriminating, instead of wholesale isms.
55 It thus smooths a path for orderly and continuous progress. The innovator has a case to
prove. He is the propounder of a hypothesis that the welfare of society would be promoted by the
adoption of a certain change, that if this harms a special class for a time, this loss to the class is in
the interests of the community of the whole, and is the measure of justice to some other class now
suffering from inadequate social recognition.  He does not present himself as a mere rebel,
hostile to the authority as such, willing to tear down recklessly in a blind hope something
better may appear. His claim that certain defects exist, and that they may be remedied by
the adoption of certain proposed measures of change are propositions to be examined in the




Lecture VI [Chapter Communication and Associated
Living, pp. 90-98]
56 The  supreme  test  of  any  social  arrangement,  custom,  institution,  law  etc.  is  its
relationship  to  promoting  living  together,  association,  intercourse,  communication  –
exchange  of  feelings  and  ideas  that  makes  experiences  common  (common,
communication, community). Does it further full, free all-around passage, transmission of
social  values,  material  and  ideal?  Or  does  it  like  the  caste  system,  like  classes
stratification, build up walls, produce exclusiveness, aloofness, non-intercourse? Does it
like the autocratic system in government and industry,  like the ancestral  patriarchal
family system, make the channels of communication one-sided, going from superior to
inferior, but checking and clogging any reflex action? Does it keep the social arrangement
flexible, capable of modification through interaction with other arrangements, or does it
harden and ossify into rigidity? A development of the meaning of such questions, as social
tests, criteria, is the subject of today.
57 1. True social or community life means inter-action, reciprocal influence, mutual response
to the needs and claims of the other parts of partners in the combination. The import of
this idea is best seen in its negation.
[End page 1]
 
Lecture X [Chapter The State, pp. 125-132]
58 We now come to a discussion of the distinctively political aspect of social life. It may be
marked off by the nature of the problems with which it deals: These are such questions as
Lectures in Social and Political Philosophy
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VII-2 | 2015
20
I) the nature and scope of the State, or the problem of political authority; II) the nature
and constitution of  Government,  or  the agencies  of  exercise of  authority,  the value of
various forms of Government, as monarchy, empire, aristocracy, democracy, pure versus
representative democracy, the legitimate powers of government, legislative, executive
and judicial and the relation among them, etc.; III) the nature and [the] scope of Law, its
relation to Government on one hand [and] to the citizen on the other; IV) The system of
legal Rights and Duties or obligations in which the system of law becomes concrete and
operative. If we attempt to define the conception of the political instead of enumerating
the various problems included in the discussion, we may get help by noting two things.
First  the conception of  Law runs through all  the problems mentioned.  Secondly,  the
conception that law has an authority which is not simply moralistic – that is which does
not depend merely upon its recognition by the individual conscience but which is enforced
even against personal wish by some general agency. Whenever we begin to consider what
any particular individual may lawfully do, and what he can do only unlawfully, and what
agencies and means prescribe what is lawful and what not, and protect him within his
sphere  of  lawful activities,  and  limit  him,  restrain  and  penalize  him in  his  unlawful
activities we are within the sphere of political discussion.
59 We begin the discussion with a consideration of the meaning of the State as a supreme
political authority. We must however note that law and authority are not coextensive
with the State as we now know the State,  and that  the present identification of  the
problem of the nature of the state with the nature of political authority, the power to
make law and enforce laws of conduct is a product of historical development which has
not everywhere gone on to the same extent – that for example
[End page 1] 
many of the present problems of China are closely connected with the fact that she is face
to face with peoples and countries who have carried the formation and consolidation of
[the] State as the centre of social regulation further than China has done. As was noted
earlier,  the  family  and  clan  organization,  based  on  blood  tie  real  or  imputed,  was
doubtless the first organization to exercise control, to determine what its members could
and could not do, and to reward and punish them. It contributed the paternalistic or even
patriarchal conception to the State when the latter was formed, and in connection with
certain religious and moral creeds became the backbone of the absolutistic state,  the
State which centres mystically in a single family or individual, of a semi-divine or super-
man character – an Emperor, Ceasar, Mikado. Even the most extreme form of political
anarchism –  that  which desires  the abolition of  the State  –  must  still  recognize  the
existence of some social group, which as a group, exercises some control and discipline
over its members – unions, societies, corporations, partnerships, schools collectively etc.
It throws light upon the problems of politics to note that every such organization has
rules  and regulations,  either  written or  unwritten.  While  the  anarchist  may put  the
emphasis upon the right of any individual to enter or leave any such organization at his
own sweet will, yet he must admit that children for example are not in any position to
exercise such choice, and that entering any continuing organization entails permanent
obligations – that is, puts one under some authority. Thus I knew an anarchist society in
the US where every member pledged himself never to vote or take office, to have as little
to do with government and officials as possible. The pledge to the organization was of the
nature of acceptance of political authority. In practice it will be found that anarchism, or
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the denial of the value and validity of all  political ideas and activities,  centres in two
things: distrust of the State in the forms in which it now exists as a beneficial
[End page 2] 
political  agency –  not  so  much a  denial  of  politics  as  of  a  certain organ as  the  best
instrument of social regulation, and secondly, in the belief that all exercise of physical force
for coercion or repression is unjustifiable. The former point while important is clearly
secondary. Now this use of force is usually taken to mark off the region of the legal and
political from purely Moral. Hence this problem is central. What if any is the justification
for the use of force in connection with observance of law, of rules of notion, and with
penalization for departure from the rules which are inherent in every continuing social
organization? Shall individuals be left to be the sole judges? Shall the sole penalty be
social  disapproval  expressed  in  purely  moral  forms  and  without  regular  means  of
expression – that is, an agreement on the part of all members of the community to refuse
to speak to anyone who did a certain thing, would certainly imply political organization
and might have physical consequences, sickness and death. Is it wrong to use force or the
threat of force to get things done which an individual does not wish to do or to use it to
restrict his liberty of action – taking property away from him, putting him in prison or to
death?
60 The following considerations may be borne in mind.
61 1. It is not possible to make a sharp absolutistic separation between the moral and the
physical.  The issue is not between physical force on one side and moral force on the
other. It is between an intelligent and constructive use of physical force and a negative,
wasteful destructive one.  Physical force must be used in any case.  The problem is to
regulate its  use to get the best results;  the moral  question has to do with its  use as
measured or judged by consequences. Most physical force used even by a despotic state
operates through mental intermediaries – through threats of punishment. It appeals to a
motive, and thence a moral factor is introduced. The trouble is that the motive is so
largely a negative one, fear, timidity, desire to keep out of trouble,
[End page 3]
motives that depress and thwart human energy instead of evoking it for use, in those
upon when the threat of punitive force is exercised, while in those who exercise it, it
stimulates only the most rudimentary mental energies. Possession of force is such an easy
resource that it does not call out foresight, ingenuity or consideration of complex factors.
In evoking only the cruder human powers, it also encourages an irregular uncoordinated
use of them – what we call arbitrary action. Even where the use of force upon the part of
governing officials  is  itself  regulated by law,  it  must be admitted that much force is
employed stupidly – as for example in the ordinary jails and prisons. Force is us used
wisely when it is used to arouse attention, to make men think, to reconsider their course
of action, to form plans better adapted to maintain order. It is used unwisely when it
produces only emotional reactions, fear, resentment, hatred, sullenness, or when it dulls
and depresses power of observation and reflection, circumscribes thought.
62 On the other hand, moral force without some physical expression is an impossibility.
Every act requires physical energy for execution and it changes the environment in some
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way. The use of judgment, persuasion, reasoning, appeal to conscience, statement of the
case are distinctively moral, but they can be manifested only through physical agencies.
Sarcasm may be as painful as a lash of a whip, reproof may be harder to bear than a slap.
Moreover the use of speech may not be adequate evidence of genuine belief or conviction.
What a person is willing to do is a proof whether there is anything more than speech.
Talk is cheap. Is the person willing to back up his talk by other actions? Readiness to act
upon believe when involving risk is the universal evidence that an idea is real. Ideas and
ideals that persons do not care to enforce, to use energy to carry out, are unreal.
63 If moral force cannot be separated from physical, what then is
[End page 4]
meant by it? Two elements in moral force; [it] assumes community of interest not hostility.
[It]  Assumes that both parties have a like interest in reaching an understanding and
settlement, and that the other party is willing to cooperate in reaching a conclusion.
Much use of  force even in behalf  of  justice and right  assumes hostility,  antagonism,
unwillingness on the part of the other side to come to a reasonable and right conclusion.
Hence friction and recriminations are excited. The other person assumes that he can
make his claim good only by resort to violence. The excitement of resentment and ill-will
produces more new wrongs than were settled. Use of persuasion, discussion, assumes
reasonableness and at least moderate friendliness on the part of another party. Kindly
treatment  is  sometimes  disarming.  Hence  even  when  this  method  of  persuasion  by
argument cannot be used further because of  the unwillingness of  the other party to
engage, force should be used in such a way as to promote attention and thoughtfulness
rather than [as] an end in itself. The question is the kind and manner of using force that
will  best  develop  the  reasonable  attitude.  Passive  or  active  resistance,  positive
punishment or isolation, withdrawal of intercourse?
64 We may distinguish three grades of force. One power, energy in carrying out ends, which
is not only an evidence of good faith and sincerity of belief but also the only way this
moral  ideas can be anything more than inner idle sentiments.  Second is  such use of
energy as disturbs others inflicts pain or suffering or loss upon others. Now the fact that
this is exercised by the state instead of by an individual doesn’t of itself justify it. The
question is whether it is used in such a way that the loss brings the other party to a more
reasonable frame of mind, and makes possible intercourse on terms beneficial to both.
Then in the third place, there is violence – force which is destructive, harmful with no
educative or restorative affect at all – or one quite subordinate to the destructiveness
wrought. It must be
[End page 5] 
admitted that much action by states, as well as by private individuals, and in peace as well
as in war, violence judged by this criterion and hence to be morally condemned. But
provision of schools is almost wholly a constructive work. Schools require money. If a
group of persons refuse to contribute, force may be used to bring them to a better mind
(to pay taxes) as well as to carry on the constructive work. Cases of legitimate coercion,
compulsion, coercion, fall in this class.
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65 If we add another consideration, the theoretical justification for some use of force by the
state as an organization is completed. It was said that any social ideal must be based upon
the facts,  the necessities of human nature and the world. Now the sense of injustice,
resentment and redress are very strong in human nature. If there is no public agency of
justice private persons will take correction and reprisals in their own hands. In the end
there will be more irregular wasteful destructive force, more invasion of the freedom of
others, than if there were a public reservoir of force. State action is a draft, a diversion, of
private action which is economically expedient. The case is seen in war between nations.
What is needed is some superior judge and administrator. Without it, every individual
nation arms and betakes itself to force when it thinks or fancies it is wronged. So before
the institution of public agencies armed with force,  there was more or less a feud, a
private war, going on all the time. Moreover without any bad intention persons run into
each other and do harm in the course of each carrying out his own plans. Some kind of
impartial arbiter with power to enforce decision is needed.
66 These  arguments  do not  establish the  fact  that  the  State  should be  the  umpire  and
executor.  They only point to the need of some outside party,  beyond the individuals
immediately  concerned.  When,  however,  social  relations  become  complicated,  and  a
wider and wider range
[End page 6]
of interests are affected, when the consequences of acts spread beyond the individual to
third parties, the agency called into operation must become increasingly permanent and
comprehensive in its action. The obvious objection for example to the anarchistic theory
of perfectly free relations in marriage, with no public supervision or control at all, is that
the marriage relation does not terminate with the two persons directly concerned. The
natural consequence of marriage is children, and their interests must be conserved. If the
intelligence and affection of parents doesn’t suffice, then there must be an outside power,
somebody authorized to act, with coercion and control if necessary. Now the different
parts of modern society grow more and more interlaced. It is more and more impossible
to say that the effect of any act is limited to the parties directly engaged [?] in it. The
effect upon the interest and happiness and positive freedom of others is such that there
must be an agency at least as extensive and enduring as the interests concerned. Hence
the development of the modern state. It is fair to say that if the anarchistic experiment
were  tried  with  good  faith  and  intelligence  under  all  [the]  complex  conditions  of
civilization and over any large territory, it would soon develop an agency for regulation
and for settlement of disputes and conflicts. The people in relation to this agency might
not be called a State, but it would be like the State. The most that could be said for it is
that it would exercise the functions of the present state in a more effective way with less
accompanying abuses.
67 This discussion while centering about the objection to all  use of coercion in law and
administration as immoral extends much further. In showing how force should be used,
the ends for which it should be used, we get a moral criterion for judging the state, and
also get light thrown upon the problems connected with the historic evolution of the
state. Historically it must be admitted that the state originated 
[End page 7]
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in violence and oppression, in conquest of one people by another usually and [in] the
desire of the victorious people to hold the conquered in such subjection that they could
exploit them. It must be admitted that the historic state has been conducted largely in the
interests of an exploiting governing few, a reigning house or dynasty, or an economic
class  that  could use political  power to further its  own interests.  But  it  must  also be
admitted  that  political  struggles  have  been waged against  these  conditions,  and  the
political struggle for democratic government has been in the main an attempt to see that
the state functioned in behalf of the public interest – that it legislates and administers in
the interest of the people at large.
68 The other element in the criterion is that the operations of the state be as constructive as
possible – that in its effects upon human nature its work be fostering, cultivating, rather
than restrictive and choking, that it uses power to call out attention and thought rather
than mere blind emotion, and that it stimulates publicity, communication, spread of ideas
and enlightenment, instead of encouraging [illeg.], and the withholding of knowledge and
skill.
69 For the long time in early modern thought political controversy centred about the worth
of the state, being carried on by those who held that a limitation of the arbitrary power of
the state was the most essential thing in England, and upon the continent by those who
were impressed by the value of the state as a condition of social peace and order – the
partisans of the liberal and limited state on one hand and of the absolute state on the
other. While the former have been upon the whole successful in their desire to develop a
government which should be representative of the public interest and responsible to the
people, the latter have been largely successful in imposing their view of the state itself as
sovereign and supreme,  having no authority above it  and owing no responsibility to
anybody. In other words, the nationalist state has been gaining in 
[End page 8]
power and dignity, while the action of legislators and administrators has been hedged
about by more and more popular checks. Before considering the seeming contradiction
presented by a state that is absolute while its organs of action – the government – are
limited, we shall consider the two doctrines of the two schools of political thought.
[End page 9]
 
Lecture XI [Chapter The Government, pp. 133-140]
70 As was pointed out, the state is more than a people possessing a common territory; more
even than a people a society, with a country and a common language, history, tradition
and moral outlook. It implies a political organization also, an organization of the people
for the purpose of exercising authority within and without, that is with respects to other
peoples and countries, and also with respect to its own constituents. The organ, agency,
instrumentality for the exercise of this authority is Government. The importance of the
expression of the State through Government is so great that there is tendency to confuse
the two. There is this much justification for the confusion that the problems of politics or
the state become acute when they focus in problem of Government. The difference is
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clearly seen in such a fact as this:  the sovereignty of  the State is  a commonplace of
modern political thought; to restrict and define the powers of Government has been the
chief political struggle of the least two or three centuries.
71 Put briefly the fundamental problem is this. The Government should be an organ of the
general interest, an expression of the public will – that is, it should stand for and enforce
the widespread interest that the whole society has in the acts of special groups or classes,
because the consequences of these special acts ramify and affect others who have no
direct concern – examples from family life, business corporation, contracts. Thus there is
required an agency to formulate, express and execute the wider interest; to keep the
activities of the various factors of the whole balanced and proportionate. Now this is a
task of delicacy and complexity. For it deals with regulation of the indirect and remote
consequences of acts – the public interest is not so immediate and conspicuous as the
private.  Is  human  wisdom  equal  to  the  task?  But  aside  from  this  difficulty,  the
Government is itself composed of human beings having their own private interests, their
own love of power and gain. Government is not an abstract idea,
[End page 1] 
impersonal and transparent, but involves an aggregate of human beings with the same
appetites and passions as their fellows. Is it then safe to clothe with power? Will not the
fact  that  their  power  has  a  social  and  moral  sanction  only  add  to  the  ease  and
thoroughness  with  which  they  can  use  it  for  their  own  ends,  or  make  the  task  of
maintaining  public  order  and  security  incidental  to  their  own  power,  glory  and
enjoyment? Put in a less extreme form we get the problem which has controlled both the
political  theories and the political  struggles of  the Western world for three hundred
years:  How shall  Government  be  constituted  so  that  it  shall  adequately  perform its
legitimate function, that is [to] operate in the public interest, in behalf of the country as a
whole, and not encourage the possessors of authority to employ it for their own special
interests? How shall power enough be granted to fulfill the first task and yet that power
be limited in its concrete exercise?
72 The  problem  consisted  of  two  factors.  One  was  historic.  There  was  in  existence
Government  by  dynasties  –  that  is,  by  families  claiming  superior  birth  and  rank,
patrimonial possession of the country, reigning by divine or some other unquestionable
authority, and therefore not responsible to the people,  responsible only to God – the
absolutistic  state  in  theory  whether  so  exercised  in  practice  or  not.  This  was  the
particular  historic  background.  The other  factor  is  the  standing one –  a  problem of
human nature. Irresponsible power tends to arbitrary and selfish action. As Lincoln put it
“No man is wise or good enough to govern other men without their consent.” Expanded
somewhat, “No matter how wise and good at the outset, wisdom and goodness deteriorate
when combined with possession of irresponsible power over others.” A Chinese scholar
has acutely remarked that the European theory of responsible Government is based upon
a belief in the inherent badness of men, and the consequent needs of checks even upon
rulers. While the old Chinese theory was based upon faith in the intrinsic
[End page 2]
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goodness of human nature, the orderliness and loyalty of the subjects, the wisdom and
benevolence  of  rulers.  Hence  the  Confucian  political  philosophy  really  assumed  the
supremacy of  moral  forces,  while  the European philosophies –  at  least  of  the liberal
school – have assumed the need of physical backing in order to prevent the immoral
forces from becoming supreme. This raises a great problem, but it would be truer to state
that the European theory is based not upon belief in the inherent badness of human
nature, but that possession of unchecked power inevitably corrupts human nature – it
becomes evil and foolish under such conditions. Another remark that may be made is that
the increasing complexity and mobility of modern life has immensely increased the range
of questions and affairs in which there is a public interest. Big association of labor and
capital, growth of foreign and domestic commerce, selling goods at a distance, travel,
transportation,  telegraphs,  doing  business  at  a  distance,  migration  and  mobility  of
populations,  has  lessened  the  hold  of  local  moral  influences,  those  that  come  from
subjection of an individual to the stead inspection and judgment of his own local and
definite  permanent group,  while  it  has  also increased the remoteness [of]  scope and
indirectness of consequences. Hence more public or political action is demanded than in a
society that is continuing on old lines. The decay of customary control means an increase
of legislative and administrative control.  The channels in which moral forces operate
change. Hence the absurdity of the plea sometimes heard – at least from foreigners – that
while new methods of industry, commerce, finance etc. should be introduced into China,
railways and factories etc., the old moral basis of social organization and government
should be left intact. This is impossible, so there is no use of discussing its desirability.
The mere effect of rapid and easy communication in making a population mobile means
inevitably a lessening of the old family and neighborhood control and the
[End page 3] 
need  of  new  organs.  The  political  problems  of  China  today  thus  resemble  in  many
respects those of Europe in the period of [the] most active transition, the seventeenth
century – though complicated by an additional  fact;  the changes and experiments of
Europe in the seventeenth century could go on without danger of interference from other
nations which had already passed through the transitional stage of political organization
into an integrated state.
73 We return then to a consideration of the various theories which have been evolved in
Europe in connection with this problem of the development of a Government sufficiently
powerful to maintain national security, peace and order remembering that each theory
corresponds to some strong practical act. The first type of theory was generated in the
disorder, strife and lawlessness attendant upon the break down of the authority of the
Roman Church and Holy Roman Empire – the rise of independent states, development of
trade,  shifting  from  agricultural  basis  to  industrial  one.  It  said  in  effect  that  the
importance of a strong single central power is so great in order to give men security of
life and to enforce peace within and without, that no price is too great to pay – not even
the surrender of all powers to the rulers of the state. Machiavelli, Hobbes and Spinoza on
the theoretical side were the great names in this line of solution. State morality is of a
different kind from private. The officers of the state when acting in behalf of the state are
justified in acting upon a different moral basis [than] an individual. Without the central
authority society would fly to pieces – would dissolve into anarchy and chaos, and no
morality at all would be possible even were it desired by private individuals. No powerful
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government no state, no state no society, no society no stable human morals at all. So
much is at stake therefore that rulers are justified in defense of the unity and power of
the state to resort to fraud and violence to acts that are indefensible in private morality.
This point was espec-
[End page 4]
ially [illeg.] by Machiavelli, who developed rules of statecraft – political maxims based on
the end justifies the means, and since the end is supreme it justifies in case of emergency
all and any means – expediency is the only rule. The Englishman Hobbes worked out a
detailed scheme. According to him individuals left to themselves are forced into such
conflict with one another that life becomes uncertain, property insecure – the natural
state [is] a war of all against all, from fear of attack by others, from love of gain, and from
desire for glory and honor – natural expressions of the fundamental psychological law of
self-love. But there is also a natural law, urging men to self-preservation. This leads them
to take the step which alone will make their lives secure – they all agree to surrender all
their power into the hands of some authority. They divest themselves of all natural power
and right. They agree to submit to the regulations of the Supreme power, the sovereignty
thus created, keeping nothing back. Thus power because it is sovereign is responsible to
nothing  on  earth,  only  to  conscience  and  God.  It  may  be  republican  oligarchical  or
monarchical in form. But its authority is unlimited by law or legal right. Expediency will
tell the rulers not to push their power to the extreme. Wisdom will tell them to use it for
the happiness of the whole people. But there can be no legal or political guarantees of
such use of power. For the Government is the source of all law and politics, and hence
cannot be under its  own creatures.  The only final  check is  moral  practical  –  fear of
revolution, fear that the people will repudiate the original contract they made. Spinoza
developed under conditions of continental disorder and insecurity (similar to those in
England in the first half of the seventeenth century) the germinal ideas of Machiavelli
and Hobbes. It emphasized however more than either the moral necessity of the state as a
condition of sociable relations among men and also the necessity of social relations to an
individual for the development
[End page 5]
of  his  own  personality,  rational  and  therefore  moral.  Under  the  influence  of  social
relations and intercourse alone, does the individual cease to be a creature of appetite and
impulse  making  the  private  pleasure  the  measure  of  good  and  evil,  and  becomes  a
creature who has reason, that is a universal measure of good and evil. But only through
the recognition of law, which is a product of political authority, does man emerge into the
rational and moral estate. Spinoza, however, also held that while any form of government
is preferable to no government (and therefore revolution is never justifiable) yet the
republican form of Government is the ideal, and that in the degree in which humanity
should, under the influence of law, become rational, would be the goal toward which the
future  evolutions  of  states  would  certainly  tend.  Meantime,  more  arbitrary  kinds  of
governments were at least a school master to restrain the reign of appetite and passion in
the masses and create the conditions for the education into rationality. In that sense
every state, even the worst, is an expression of divine reason. The state rather than the
church is the representative of God, the Absolute on earth. There is but one necessary
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moral limit to state action. Since it exists to make possible the evolution from a state of
appetite to one of  reason and law,  it  cannot encroach upon liberty of  thought [and]
liberty of reason without contradicting itself.
74 In  some  form  or  other  the  theory  of  the  necessity  of  political  organization  to  the
existence  of  society,  that  is,  of  peaceful  and  orderly  and  mutual  helpful  human
intercourse, became an axiom of all continental thought. Hence the power of the state is
the  foundation  of  morals,  either  actively  or  negatively  a  condition  without  which
individuals could not be truly moral. Its importance is such that it must be absolute and
irresponsible. France at the time of the revolution had been influenced by the liberal
theory of England still
[End page 6]
to be discussed, and threw it over. But it remained for Europe, especially for German,
modified by the form into which it was thrown by the German philosophers who made a
synthesis of Spinoza with the political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, according to
which the state is the culmination of a manifestation of divine reason and will on the
earth. It is superindividual and superhuman – an objectification in the form of time of the
eternal purposes, meanings, Ideas, of God. The liberal philosophy, it was claimed, had
gone into bankruptcy, committed suicide, in the excesses of the French Revolution, which
had proclaimed the principle of individual liberty and rights. As against that the German
theory of the State asserted the supremacy of the value and dignity of the state, which
humanly speaking, could in essentials do nothing wrong in respect to its subjects, while
in its contests with other states, victory was a God given sign of which had right on its
side. As one state exhausts its mandate from Divine will, as revealed in its defeat, spiritual
and moral domination, as well as political passes to another nation.
75 (See,  German  Philosophy  and  Politics)  The  political  history  of  Europe  cannot  be
understood without  knowledge of  the  extent  to  which this  view of  the  State  as  the
foundation not only of secure material life but of secure moral life has influenced men’s
minds. Under the guise of idealistic philosophy and a progressive evolution of absolute
purposes, Hegel reestablishes in a modernized form the exploded doctrine of [the] divine
right  of  kings,  and  the  rulers  of  Prussia  made  these  conceptions  the  basis  of  an
enlightened and in many ways benevolent despotism. The effect of the theory was double.
On the one hand, it supplied a philosophic basis for autocracy, supported the practical
demand for a strong army as the proper arm of the centralized state, and thus promoted
militarism,  and also fostered a  conviction among the Germans that  their  Kultur  was
higher than that of other peoples, since they 
[End page 7]
alone realized the ethical function and superhuman basis of the state. It gave a mystic
quality  to  state  activities  which  protected  [illeg.]  examination  and  criticism  by  the
common  citizen,  and  led  to  an  identification  of  moral  duty  with  submission  to  the
direction of the state. But since in effect, the state is administered through a government,
this mystic doctrine really maintained the supremacy of a certain class. To the credit of
the philosophy must be put its stimulation of the conception of the state as a cultural
agency, not simply [as] a tool of police order. According to it, individuals in isolation are
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incapable of  coping with ignorance,  want,  destitution,  poverty and misery.  The state
[through] government must foster art and science as well as promote education. It must
not only protect individuals in their property but must make it possible for them to have
and keep property. Hence a general system of insurance against sickness accident old age,
unemployment etc. These things might be carried on by any modern state on the basis of
some other political philosophy, but there is no doubt that the conception of the state as
higher and deeper than society and the chief  agency of  moral  existence made these
activities easier of adoption and execution, and that the states which have been most
influenced by the liberalistic philosophy – which we shall now discuss – were [illeg.] in
their  measures  of  social  welfare  under  political  authority,  and that  so  far  voluntary
means, philanthropy etc., have not made good the deficit.
[End page 8]
 
Lecture XII [Chapter Political Liberalism, pp. 141-146]
76 The problem under discussion is the nature of the exercise of power by the state. How
does power acquire moral validity, authority, how does it become right? The answer of
the school whose theory was discussed at the last hour is in effect that the question is
meaningless; that apart from the organization of social life which is termed the state,
there are no such things as right and wrong effective among men. The state is the basis of
the possibility of a genuine righteousness among men; without it men will live the life of
appetite and passion, that is of brutes, even if of refined brutes; that the repressive and
disciplinary side of the state, its political side, is incidental and secondary to its higher
value in making rational action and concord based upon it possible. We come now to the
theory which holds that the individuals live in society,  live morally prior to political
authority and that the existence of a power which restricts individual choice and action,
that is liberty, is a real problem – that the state requires justification, and that there is
but one way of justifying it. Government is just legitimate, has authority instead of brute
power, only when it protects and secures rights that exist independently of it, in idea or
even in time prior to its formation. John Locke was the first great spokesman of this
political philosophy of liberalism. He wrote in effect to justify the political revolution of
1688 whereby the Stuart dynasty was expelled and a new dynasty under constitutional
restrictions  brought  in.  The so-called limited monarchy,  or  more correctly  speaking,
government which is under definite responsibilities to the people in the exercise of its
powers. Locke like Hobbes believed that political society originated in a compact and
derived its powers from that compact. But unlike Hobbes he didn’t believe that man in
the  natural  (pre-political  state)  was  wholly  selfish  and  egoistic  and  non-moral.  He
believed that he was a rational and social creature, recognizing his obligations to his
fellows, and 
[End page 1]
in the main inclined to act upon reasonably, rightly. But the state of nature had some
great inconveniences. There was no one authorized to declare and promulgate the law of
right  intercourse  with  one’s  fellows;  there  was  uncertainty  and  obscurity  as  to
obligations. Moreover, in case of dispute or conflict there was no impartial judge, and no
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impartial executor of justice, no impartial redressor of wrongs. Each individual is likely to
be prejudiced in judging his own case and to be passionate and unwise in securing his
rights and rectifying his wrongs. Hence, sensible of these inconveniences, that is of the
bad consequences of this condition, men met together, and agreed to surrender their
right to judge and execute, to protect and redress by force their own rights. This they
handed over to political authority to government which therefore came into existence as
a funded or pooled power. But its powers were strictly limited by terms of the bargain or
agreement that gave it existence. Its sole business is to promulgate the law, to judge of
disputes between citizens and to secure fulfillment of its decisions. For these ends /sum
total of the/ it has the powers of all citizens at command. And the citizens consent to this
and agree to obey. But this power is limited to securing certain ends – the security of the
life and property of the citizens. Men did not give up all their liberties for the sake of
doing so; they gave up a few liberties in order to make the rest of their rights more
certain and guaranteed. When the political  authority (like that of the Stuarts) passes
these bounds, and renders life and property insecure by arbitrary action, it is a usurper. It
breaks the terms of the agreement upon which its power depends. Revolution under such
circumstances is not illegal rebellion. It is merely a recognition by the people that the
Government has abdicated its functions and is no longer a legitimate authority. In effect
the  people  reserve  the  right  to  decide  whether  the  Government  is  carrying out  the
purposes of the
[End page 2] 
original contract.
77 Many persons have thought that the theory was exploded when it was shown that such
compacts  were  not  the  historical  origin  of  government,  that  they  are  purely
mythological,  historically speaking.  But the fundamental idea is not touched thereby.
Locke was not trying to account for the actual origin of governments. He was trying to
account for the source of the rightful power of the government or political authority. And
he found it in the use of this power to make the rights of individuals clear and explicit by
promulgating laws, and to protect individuals in the surer and more constant exercise of
their rights. Government exists for the sake of maintaining rights that exist in idea if not
in historic time before it. The theory proclaimed the responsibility of all government to
certain ends for the sake of which it exists, and the right of the citizens to determine
whether the government is serving or destroying those ends. It brought the discussion of
state affairs within the region of experience, out of the vague and mysterious air of divine
rights and the superman, into the region of judgment and examination by commonsense
tests of utility.  It  was in no sense a revolutionary theory except at crises of extreme
misgovernment. It was but a check on possible excessive arbitrary action. It did not hold
that in the [illeg.] of legitimate government the people were the actual holders of political
power  and authority.  Locke was  a  monarchist  not  a  republican,  but  a  constitutional
monarchist.  The radical  step was taken by Rousseau who was the philosopher of the
French Revolution of 1789 as Locke was of that of 1688 in Great Britain. Rousseau held
that there were no legitimate governments in existence, but that a just one might come
into existence when all  the people made a contract with one another – not with the
government – to surrender all their private wills to a common will which should put the
force of all individuals back of the rights and liberties of every member of society. The
government is but a hired 
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[End page 3]
servant to be engaged and dismissed at the will of the collective people for executing,
carrying out its declared purpose. Thus the organized people are the sole repository of
political  power  which  they  never  surrender  for  any  purpose.  The  only  legitimate
government is the democratic where the people as a body makes law – the legislative
function being the prerogative of sovereignty because it declares the common will and
interest. Thus the idea of popular sovereignty was extended from the original formation
of political society and its spasmodic exercise in case of extreme misgovernment to the
regular and constant maintenance of political activity.  Only the democratic state is a
legitimate form of state because the only one that solves the problem of reconciling
individual liberty with the common good.
78 This doctrine while embodied more or less in the French Revolution did not take root in
England where it  was regarded as revolutionary as Bolshevism is  today.  In the early
nineteenth century however Locke’s liberalism was greatly modified by a new movement
of thought, proceeding from leaders of the utilitarian school. Locke’s theory was largely
as [we] have seen negative in its practical workings out. It aimed at preventing extreme
abuses  in  government.  It  was  quite  consistent  with  such  an  oligarchy  as  governed
England till the Reform Bill of 1832 and later. The reformers of liberalism wanted positive
guarantees that the Government would actually operate for the greatest  good of  the
greatest number instead of in behalf of class interests – democratic in effect though not a
pure democracy like Rousseau’s in source. Their main ideas were (1) that each individual
is the best judge of his own interests and welfare. Therefore there must be universal
suffrage, so that the interest of each shall receive an equitable, fair expression. Everyone
knows where the shoe pinches his own [foot], no one can possibly represent him in the
primary expression of his desires. (2) [Members] of government, of the official class are
individuals who left to themselves will pursue their own interests. There must be 
[End page 4]
such measures as will make them identify their own interests with those of the people.
Frequent and stated elections is the means. By having to render an account frequently,
they will be made responsible to the people and find their own interest in serving their
constituents – the idea of representative government. (3) Paradoxical as it sounds, the
lawmakers must themselves be under [the] law and act according to it. There must be a
fundamental  law  which  shall  determine  not  merely  how  judges  and  administrative
officials shall act but which shall decide what the lawmakers shall and shall not do and
how they may do it – a constitution.
79 (1)  Popular  suffrage,  representative  legislatures,  parliaments,  congresses,  (2)
responsibility to the electorate, and (3) constitutional government were thus the three
great planks of the modern struggle for popular or republican government.  The first
plank was directed against the aristocratic notion that a wise selected class shall govern,
on the ground that even the ignorant man knows his own wants and sufferings better
than some one else. The second was aimed at securing legislation by orderly and public
discussions of representatives of the people,  directed against pure democracy on one
hand – direct lawmaking by people – and against personal government by mandates and
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edits,  pronouncements  of  officials  on  other.  The  third  was directed  to  combining
permanence and continuity in the state with fundamental guarantees of a political sort
against abuse of power and with provision for regular change as conditions [of] change –
amendments to the fundamental or organic law. The end is well expressed in the words of
American statesmen which however  go  back  to  Aristotle  “in  order  that  government
should be a government of laws and not of men.”
[End page 5]
80 In the various  forms of  liberal  political  philosophy we have the elements  of  political
democracy set forth. These are: (1) The people are the source of political power, that is,
authority to govern, to legislate and administrate proceeds from them, not from any
superhuman force, not from a ruling dynasty or family, nor from a selected class. The
idea  of  “Government  by consent  of  the  governed” seems like  an inversion,  a  verbal
paradox, but it conveys the idea that the people as a whole is the depository of power
which in a certain sense it  may be said only to delegate to the specific persons who
govern. (2) The state exists for society, for promoting human intercourse, not society for
the state. Rule, order, law and submission, are not valuable for their own sakes, but only
for [the] sake of furthering of deepening and extending the processes of living together.
The  great  error  in  the  theories of  liberalism is  [that]  they  tended  to  make  political
organization a means of purely individual welfare, the rights of individuals conceived
apart from the social ties and connections through which alone the individual can attain
a full life (Hence reduction of happiness to pleasure in utilitarianism, and emphasis upon
security, upon possession. Recognize state as tool of society and happiness will be seen to
be found in establishing connections with others, and development to be more important
than security). (2) The government is responsible to the people. It must be so organized as
to render an account, to be liable to the people for the way in which it administers its
affairs  in  the  interest  of  the  people.  Suffrage,  representative  lawmaking  bodies,  a
constitution, a distribution of powers among legislative executive, judiciary, so that each
will not assume functions of others, the definition by law of the powers and limits of
power of each official, provision for penalty the same as for private citizens – these things
are not ends in themselves.  They have no intrinsic sacredness.  But they are the best
devices yet invented for keeping officials responsible
[End page 6]
to the public will.  These means are not perfect  and will  doubtless be improved.  The
extension of suffrage irrespective of sex, wealth or even education has been resorted to in
order that an adequate expression of public will might be secured on one hand, and on
the other that all persons might become interested in public affairs, might be sharing be
awaken  to  recognition  of  their  public  responsibilities  and  abilities.  Referendum and
initiative are experiments in combining elements of pure democracy with representative.
81 The error in liberalism in thinking that the state originated in the choice of isolated
individuals and aims to protect them as individuals in their rights resulted in two other
errors. The first was in thinking of government as a kind of necessary evil, a surrender of
some rights and liberties in order to be more certain of others – especially of physical
existence and property (The especial possession of individual as such – see Locke). In fact
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the government is an organ or tool for the realization of public interests, the things that
men have in common, that affect all in the way they work out, in their consequences. For
example,  roads,  regular  means  of  communication,  schools,  money,  land  coal,  water
supply. It does not follow of necessity that government must own these things, but it must
see that they operate [and] function for general welfare [and] not for private gain. How
this shall be accomplished is scientific rather than a moral matter – the end however is
moral and positive, constructive. Private ownership can be tolerated only if upon the
whole  this  is  a  better  means  of  serving  the  universal  interest.  Jealously,  distrust,
suspicion of government has always come about as a survival of the dynastic, family, and
superhuman state – formerly in Great Britain and US, now in Russia and Chine. This
survival after the political organization has become democratic hampers the full use of
the government as a democratic tool. It fosters private disregard of the public interest in
social undertakings, economic and otherwise, the feel-
[End page 7]
ing that one business, one’s affairs are his own private and exclusive concerns, that any
public supervision or regulation is an impertinent interference, an encroachment upon
proper personal liberty. This attitude tends not only to weaken government, to render it
incompetent, but also tends to corruption – the strong private organizations, corporate
cliques,  militaristic  or  industrial,  use  governmental  powers  to  promote  their  special
interests at the expense of the public. The argument against extension of public activities,
namely that government is both more corrupt and more incapable than private agencies,
is largely due to two causes – one a survival of the non democratic government, the other
the effect of an exaggeration of private activities.
82 The other great mistake of liberal philosophy was in supposing that the individual is an
adequate judge of his own interest, and this self-interest of each may be counted upon to
secure a regard for the net welfare of all. Modern society is so complex and so mobile,
changing,  that  most  measures  of  political  activity,  legislative  and administrative  are
beyond the reach of judgment on the basis of personal interest. Loyalty to a group, a
class, a country, a party, is more effective with most men than consideration for their
self-interest – the latter is likely to lead either to abstinence from political activity, or to a
corrupt employment of public agencies which prostitutes them to means of private gain
and prestige. A public interest and public opinion rather than self-interest and judgment of
what  is  to  [be]  the  interests  of  the  self  must  be  the  chief  reliances  of  democratic
government.  This  is  why the attempt to introduce political  democracy as  a  separate
institution (that is suffrage, constitutions, parliaments etc.) has often failed. [It] will work
on where there is a public, a civic conscience, where men are habituated to thinking as
citizens, that is,  as from the standpoint of the whole society and not from private or
family or class standpoint, and where there is public opinion – that is means for popular
discussion, exchange, com-
[End page 8]
munication. Physical things like telegraph, railways, letters, travel, newspapers, as well as
rights  of  public  meetings,  rights  of  assembly,  petition,  publication  are  parts  of  the
machinery of creation of a truly public opinion.
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83 Rubbing  of  social  elements  against  each  other,  breaking  down  of  barriers  to  free
communication and positive facilities for diffusion of ideas and knowledge are necessary.
Hence also universal education as a public charge – to get both a public interest and
ability to use the tools by which public opinion is produced – expression of one’s own
point of view and reception of other men.
84 Political democracy thus runs into the broader moral and social democracy. The ulterior
justification of political democracy, that is of popular government, is its educative effect.
That is, its effect in broadening the interests and imagination, in extending sentiments
from personal and local and family, clique interests, to take in the welfare of the country,
producing a public conscience and civic loyalty; and its effect in stimulating thought,
ideas and their expression about social matters.
85 Carlyle  ridiculed  parliament,  calling  attention  to  the  fact  that  literally  it  means  a
collection of talkers. He made fun of the notion that by enactment following upon talking
men could make laws – they might as well talk the multiplication-table into existence, he
said. But experience shows that social laws, that is desirable regulations of conduct are
not easy to discover, and that up to the present general discussion, speech back and forth
is the best way hit upon to bring them to light. Mutual speech subjects ideas to criticism,
improves them by selection and combination, leads to new thought and to inquiries. It
brings to light hidden considerations, and broadens the range of ideas that influences
action. In short, government tends to be at last resort by public opinion, and the only way
to improve government is to improve public opinion by improving ideas and the methods
of their circulation. Suffrage, chambers of deputies etc., are ultimately means of creating
and expressing public opinion.
[End page 9]
 
Lecture XIV [Chapter Intellectual Freedom, pp. 173-180]
86 At  the  last  hour  we  discussed  the  dependence of  social  life  in  its  varied  forms  upon
intellectual and ideal factors, and especially the dependence of the present crisis of the
world upon shifting in intellectual authority and influence. Today we shall discuss the
other aspect – the culmination of social institutions and arrangements in intellectual or
ideal factors. Association is something quite different from mere herding together. Sheep
crowd together for protection and warmth. Human beings associate in sharing ideas and
experiences, in seeking ends seen to be common, in exchange of opinions and discoveries,
in being loyal  to the same persons and objects.  The value of  physical  proximity and
contact lies in the intercourse of affection, thought and action it makes possible. Culture,
civilization measure the worth of social life, and civilization and culture are what they are
because of ideal elements.
87 Put  in  a  more  specific  form,  the  actual  worth  of  any  social  arrangement  lies  in  its
educative effect: its release of thought, its nurture of the imagination, its refinement of
emotions, in the persons who are influenced by it. It is for this reason that the act to
think freely and the right to express thought in choosing beliefs, forms of worship and in
free speech and publication are so important. Fear of ideas, intolerant suppression of
thought and discussion is  the common mark of  every social  tyranny.  Distrust  of  the
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people, of human nature has nowhere been more marked than in the uniform endeavor
of autocracy to limit freedom of conscience, inquiry, and publication. For the same reason
the struggle towards democracy has always centred in the struggle to secure these rights.
But the struggle of autocracy to limit thought and feeling to certain prescribed lines is
not only aimed against the central thing in democracy, but it is aimed against civ-
[End page 1]
ilization itself  for it  is  only through the development of  thought,  of  knowledge,  that
civilization exists. The fight for freedom of thought, conscience, worship belief, speech,
publication, discussion, is not merely a fight for personal freedom, but it is fight for all
that distinguishes human society from an animal herd.
88 It is sometimes said that freedom of expression may be limited by external action, but not
freedom of thought, since no outer power can make its way into inner consciousness. The
statement is false. Whatever restricts freedom of expression limits and perverts freedom
of mind. Mind lives only in communication, in give and take. It has to receive from others
to be stimulated; it has to give out in order that its ideas may take form be rendered clear
and articulate, coherent. Thought and language go together. Freedom of expression is a
necessity not only that society may get the advantage of every individual’s contribution,
but in order that the individual may have anything worth expressing.
89 Only acts,  however,  can come directly within the notice of the public and its official
representatives. Hence it is the act of speech, oral and written, that comes within the
scope of legislation and the police. Constitutional governments all guarantee citizens the
right of assembly, speech and publication. This does not mean that he [can] say anything
he  pleases  with  immunity  from  all  punishment.  If  he  incites  others  he  is  liable  to
punishment, just as when in the use of his liberty to free movement he trespasses upon
the land of another or sets fire to a building he is liable to punishment. The individual has
to take the risks of the way he uses his freedom. Two great reasons are supplied by
experience for guaranteeing this freedom. The first is the safety vale argument. Speech is
a mode of action, and when criticism and constructive suggestion are allowed in speech,
this act prevents, this act prevents more
[End page 2]
violent and destructive acts. Secondly, there are two ways of government, coercion and
persuasion. Without free speech, there is no opportunity for the use of persuasion, no
possibility for formation of public opinion. The protection against foolish ideas is found in
expression; not all people are foolish in the same way at the same time – opinions call out
counter opinion, and in the mixture of discussion some light is shed, some advance in
secure knowledge is made. No government however ever undertakes the suppression of
all communication of ideas. Certain ideas which are orthodox, which are agreeable to
social rulers are permitted and even encouraged. Only contrary ideas are prohibited. But
this implies that no social changing is to be permitted, except by the way of terrorism and
revolution. Without new ideas society would stagnate. The natural inertia of mind, the
force of custom, is a sufficient check on rapid propagation of social  changes without
additional  governmental  action.  At  times  new  and  dangerous  ideas  spread  like  an
epidemic. But this is because of other conditions besides the ideas themselves. Men that
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are hungry and desperate will listen to anything that promises relief. It is the madness of
despair that moves men rather than the ideas. Emotions, hope, revenge, not ideas are the
real moving forces – as with the Bolsheviki. The remedy is not in suppressing ideas but in
reforming  the  wrongs  that  breed  the  desperate  willingness  to  believe  anything  that
promises relief.
90 At the present time, that intellectual freedom which is the best safeguard of order as well
as means of progress has a new enemy, in addition to the old one of direct suppression. It
is propaganda, organized on a vast scale. This is more dangerous than censorship because
it has the form of free speech. It poisons the sources of belief, the wells of truth. The war
revealed its  power.  Government  rests  more  and more upon persuasion and consent.
Hence interested persons who have wealth or power try to control
[End page 3] 
the organization and distribution of news, cables, writers, newspapers. The problem of
the supply of intelligence required for proper actions can no longer be met merely by
permitting  individual  freedom  of  speech  and  writing.  There  has  to  be  a  social
organization of publicity in the interest of the public instead of some special class or
country or government. There was never a time when real knowledge of what people all
over the world are doing and thinking was so badly needed as at present, and upon the
whole there hasn’t been a time when this information was so perverted and distorted.
However much men may rightly differ as to the wisdom of schemes of socialism and
communism, all wise and sympathetic persons ought to agree upon the need of the widest
possible sharing of knowledge, including news, the knowledge as to what is going on in
society,  in  the  whole  society  of  humanity  a  communism  of  intelligence.  Public  and
universal education is a social necessity in order to give a basis for this common sharing
in knowledge and thought. But it cannot stop with school years. There must be means for
continuing the education of all members of society about the things that concern society
– its movements, problems, tendencies. In order that public opinion may control, there
must be means of forming public opinion. In order that wise public opinion may control,
the true facts must be gathered and disseminated by the press, by discussion. Private,
local and class interest will govern men’s actions until through the communication of
knowledge the whole society, nay, the whole humanity, becomes spiritually one.
91 Common or like thoughts cannot in the present stage of the world be secured either by
suppression  or  by  direct  inculcation,  by  trying  to  stamp  one  set  of  ideas  on  alike.
Divergence of opinions is necessary for progress, and the only real unity is that which
comes by exchange, based on toleration.
[End page 4]
92 Intellectual freedom is a true calculation of social life. In it individuality gets its best
expression. Only where there is intellectual freedom can communication, the give and
take of thought and feeling be full and varied. As we have seen before mere legal freedom
to labor, move about, hold property etc., is incomplete unless at the same time men’s
minds  are  free  to  share  in  the  meaning  of  what  they  do,  free  to  take  part  in
understanding the thoughts and plans that are expressed in industry and business. This
activity of thought and emotion is distinctively human, and without it man lives on a
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non-human plane. Intellectual freedom thus depends on more than absence of restrictive
laws. It depends upon positive factors and the legal right to free speech, free assembly,
publication  is  important  because  without  it  these  positive  conditions  get  no  good
opportunity for expression. These positive conditions are first education which develops
intellectual abilities and put the person in command of power to see, think and feel, and
secondly  opportunity  to  express  thought  in  action not  simply  in  words.  Freedom of
speech is precious, but it is not an end, only a means. To be able to put thought into
operation in what we do and to find that what we do contributes to our life of thought and
satisfactory sentiment and not merely to material products is the important thing. This
ideal is manifested in the work of an artist and scientific man. The painter, the laboratory
worker, is free to act upon his interest, to embody his thought. His limitations are due
only to his ignorance, and lack of skill. Also what he does brings a return wave of thought
and emotion back to him. He learns and gains intellectual skill through what he does. The
tangible, material product is secondary to this intellectual enlargement and emotional
enrichment. This basic problem of industrial society is to establish conditions that will
place all men in their labor on the plane which the small class of scientists
[End page 5] 
and artists now occupy. Then there will  be a real consummation of social  life in full
freedom. There will [be] a true social democracy.
93 The same supremacy of mental factors is seen in the political side of social life. Carlyle
made fun of popular government on the ground that it depends upon talking. It took the
word Parliament from the French word parler as the object of his wit. He ridiculed the
idea that by talking men could make social laws and more than they could make the laws
of  arithmetic  by  speech-making.  Carlyle  here  showed  an  inability  to  appreciate  the
deepest thing in democracy. It is not that talking makes laws but that only through free
and full communication, consultation, exchange, social conditions are discovered and the
public interest and welfare are made clear and plain. What is needed is even more general
participation in social discussion than we now have, an awakening of all the people to
express their needs and desires and communicate to others their suggestions. The best
value of the spread of suffrage, representative government etc. is that they promote this
tendency. Every individual is a centre of conscious life,  of happiness and suffering, of
imagination and thought. This is the final principle upon which democracy rests. But this
conscious  life  cannot  be  developed  or  realized  except  in  association  with  others,
interchange, flexible intercommunication. The relations of friends illustrates the meaning
of this. If on the personal side, democracy means that all should have the opportunity for
mental realization which artists and scientific men have, it also means that they shall be
in  the  relations  of  free  unobstructed  intercourse  with  one  another  that  friends  are.
Political democracy provides  the  machinery the  form of  this  intercourse;  it  makes  it
possible.  Education,  companionship,  the breaking down of class and family walls  and
barriers make it actual.
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NOTES
1. [In capital letters in the typescript.]
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